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Abstract  
The digital industries cluster known as 'Silicon Roundabout' has been quietly growing in East 
London since the 1990s. Now rebranded 'Tech City', it is now the focus of huge public and 
government attention. National and local policymakers wish to accelerate the local area's 
development: such cluster policies are back in vogue as part of a re-awakened interest in 
industrial policy in many developed countries. Surprisingly little is known about Tech City's 
firms or the wider ecosystem, however, and existing cluster policies have a high failure rate. 
This paper performs a detailed mixed-methods analysis, combining rich enterprise-level data 
with semi-structured interviews. We track firm and employment growth from 1997-2010 and 
identify a number of distinctive features: branching from creative to digital content industries, 
street-level sorting of firms, the importance of local amenities and a lack of conventional 
cluster actors such as universities or anchor businesses. We also argue that the existing policy 
mix embodies a number of tensions, and suggest areas for improvement. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
Since the late 1990s, a vibrant high-tech scene has been developing in Inner East London. 
Neighbourhoods around Clerkenwell Shoreditch, Hoxton and Haggerston form the core, with 
the Old Street roundabout – 'Silicon Roundabout' – at its heart. Since 2010, enormous 
attention has been focused on the area and the firms in it. The UK Government has unveiled a 
high-profile development drive – the 'Tech City' initiative. The Prime Minister aims to build 
the area into ‘one of the world’s great technology centres’ (Cameron, 2010).  More than one 
Minister has expressed the predictable desire to ‘build the UK’s Silicon Valley’ in East 
London (Nathan, 2011); simultaneously, strategy has sought to attract large-scale foreign 
investment. Ministers have also hoped to harness the Shoreditch scene to the economic 
legacy of the 2012 Olympic Games: the iCity initiative aims to develop a further technology 
cluster inside the Olympic Park (Osborne and Schmidt, 2012). The London Mayor and East 
London boroughs are also keen to make their mark, and so there has developed a raft of 
national and London-level policies covering finance, workspace, connectivity, business 
development, immigration, public-private competitions and research collaborations, as well 
as a new agency, the Tech City Investment Organisation (TCIO) to lead the 'cluster’s' 
development. 1    
 
Inner East London also matters to researchers. First, the local ‘system’ has developed in an 
organic fashion, with minimal direct policy intervention (Pratt, 2009). It is thus the opposite 
of the top-down ‘official’ clusters in countries such as France, Russia and Malaysia. Second, 
unlike well-known high-tech zones such as Silicon Valley and Silicon Wadi (Saxenian, 1994, 
Bresnahan and Gambardella, 2004a), the area’s industrial roots are in the digital/creative 
activities, rather than hardware and military-funded research. Third, we have very few hard 
facts, even down to the count of local firms: ‘official’ estimates vary from 410 to over 1100 
(Nathan et al., 2012). These knowledge gaps raises serious questions for the current policy 
mix (Nathan, 2011). Given that cluster programmes have been largely unsuccessful 
(Duranton, 2011), policymakers need to get this mix right.  
 
These UK-centric concerns echo larger academic and practical debates about the scope and 
shape of industrial policy (Rodrik, 2004). Shifting patterns of globalisation, the current crisis 
in many Northern states, and environmental challenges have all led to a resurgence of interest 
                                                 
1 http://techcity.io/, accessed 24 June 2013. 
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in active industrial management (Foray et al., 2012, Aghion et al., 2013). Notably, US and 
EU policymakers (with Regional Innovation Clusters and Smart Specialisation) have both 
endorsed cluster approaches within the industrial policy toolkit (McCann and Ortega-
Arguilés, 2011, Yu and Jackson, 2011). Tech City fits UK Ministers’ renewed interest in 
‘industrial strategy’ (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2012, Cable, 2012) and 
is seen as ‘key to the Government's industrial policy’ (Osborne, 2012).   
 
This paper performs a detailed mixed-methods analysis of the Inner East London digital 
ecosystem, and assesses its future prospects. We ask: 1) how large is the ‘hotspot’ and how 
does it function? 2) What are the opportunities and challenges facing local firms? 3) What are 
the likely impacts of the Tech City initiative?   
 
The paper is one of very few detailed explorations of these issues. There are multiple Tech 
City policy papers (BOP et al., 2011, McKinsey, 2011) but we know of only two pieces of 
primary research: Vandore (2011) surveys companies on Wired’s seminal ‘Silicon 
Roundabout’ list; Foord (2013) combines small area mapping with a firm-level survey. In 
contrast, we use rich enterprise-level data to track the cluster from 1997-2010, and conduct 
over 30 detailed semi-structured interviews. We also explore early impacts of the Tech City 
initiative on local firms, and speculate about likely longer-term effects. We deliberately focus 
on the local business community, and do not explore wider social impacts of the initiative. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out key definitions and concepts, and 
reviews relevant empirics. Section 3 outlines our methodology and data sources. Sections 4 
and 5 present results from the quantitative and qualitative empirical strands, respectively. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2.  Framework  
 
We unpick four sets of issues fundamental to understanding the Inner East London system: 
defining the ‘digital economy’; the affordances of cities for digital firms; the ‘global’ and 
‘local’ elements of digital firms' activity; and the impacts (intended and unintended) of area 
policies for the digital economy. 
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2.1  Defining the ‘digital economy’ 
 
The Inner East London system is a ‘digital economy’ cluster. The ‘digital economy’ is a 
fuzzy concept encompassing a set of industries, a set of outputs (products and services), and a 
set of inputs, production and distribution platforms used at varying intensities across the 
economy as a whole (Department for Business Innovation and Skills et al., 2010). We take an 
industry-centred view, looking at firms within the UK Government-defined ‘Information and 
Communications Technology’ industries (hence ICT) and ‘Digital Content’ industries 
(Department for Business Innovation and Skills and Department for Culture Media and Sport, 
2009). These groups are classified using SIC codes – the full list and ‘nearest neighbours’ are 
set out in Appendix 1.  
 
SIC codes aggregate outputs, input and production platform information, but are inevitably 
limited especially in relation to digital content (Centre for International Economics, 2005). 
For instance, our definition excludes ‘nearest neighbours’ in online retail, financial services 
and parts of architecture/design/engineering, but in other cases – notably advertising and 
broadcast media – includes the whole of industries still transitioning to digital platforms or 
content digital content (Cities Institute, 2011). Equally, new techniques such as ‘big data’ 
analytics are spreading across all sectors (Bakhshi et al., 2012). As we discuss below, many 
of our interviewees struggled to say whether or not they were a ‘tech’ business.   
 
2.2  Cities and the digital economy   
 
As with other parts of the knowledge economy, many digital businesses exhibit high levels of 
spatial clustering (Moretti, 2012). Urban economics and the New Economic Geography 
explain this through the productivity-enhancing functions of cities, particularly for high-value 
sectors (Marshall, 1918, Fujita et al., 1999, Glaeser, 2011).  
 
Agglomeration economies operate differently across sectors (Faggio et al., 2013). Urban 
areas’ role in raising levels of innovation and entrepreneurship is particularly important in 
digital sectors, which are characterised by high knowledge-intensity, low entry barriers, and 
thus by large numbers of small, young firms. By facilitating the flow of ideas, big, 
economically diverse urban cores act as ‘nurseries’ for start-ups and SMEs (Jacobs, 1969, 
Duranton and Puga, 2001). Innovation systems analysis emphasises how networks of 
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interdependent public and private actors shape innovative activity (Freeman, 1987). For 
instance, activist universities can also help generate innovations and assist cluster growth 
(Hausman, 2012).  Chatterji, et al (2013) highlight the strong links between initial levels of 
entrepreneurial activity in an area, and that area’s subsequent economic growth; both case 
studies and econometric work show the long-term importance of local cultures of 
entrepreneurship (Saxenian, 1994, 2006, Glaeser et al., 2012). 
 
This means that clusters often can often develop from earlier ‘versions’ of themselves. 
Duranton (2007) argues that the current location of a given urban industry is partly 
determined by the location of past breakthrough inventions, with firms relocating to 
‘breakthrough locations’: these shifts will amplify the agglomeration channels discussed 
earlier. Evolutionary economic geographers explore these trajectories in more detail, focusing 
on different modes of technological ‘branching’ (Boschma and Frenken, 2011). We need to 
test how far these various channels operate in the Inner East London system, and how far 
they shape firms’ location decisions.  
 
2.3 Digital organising logics  
 
We will also want to test the interaction between area properties and East London firms’ 
production, distribution and sales processes.  Real world clusters exhibit multiple ‘cluster 
shapes’ (Kerr and Kominers, 2012); in digital content activities, in particular, there is a strong 
tendency towards ‘micro-clustering’ at very local scales, with densely linked networks of 
firms and supporting actors (Hutton, 2008, Storper and Scott, 2009, Chapain et al., 2010). 
Core production activities are labour-intensive, dependent on complex information that 
requires face-to-face communication. The presence of multiple small firms and freelancers 
means that informal networks and ‘soft infrastructure’ such as bars and cafes are important in 
sourcing collaborators and opportunities (Currid, 2007). Knowledge spillovers are very 
localised, falling off within a few blocks (Arzaghi and Henderson, 2008). 
 
While this organising logic may apply to other actors on the production side – auxiliary 
services such as lawyers and accountants – customer geographies differ.  Low-cost digital 
sourcing, storage, communication, marketing and sales platforms jncreasingly permit SMEs 
and micro-businesses to operate as ‘micro-multinationals’ (Keeble et al., 1998, Varian, 
2005). These technological shifts may also uproot some production-side activities from 
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specific local environments, with firms adopting a mix of ‘global’ and ‘local’ organisational 
modes.  
 
2.4  Area policies for the digital economy   
 
In theory, clustering should occur 'organically', as firms sort into optimal locations (Glaeser, 
2008). In practice, this may not occur because of poor decisions, imperfect information, lack 
of finance or other constraints. The evident externalities from clustering thus create an in-
principle case for policy intervention (Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare, 2009, Helsley and 
Strange, 2012, Chatterji et al., 2013, Nathan and Overman, Forthcoming). Most area-based 
industrial policies are cluster policies (Porter, 1990, Porter, 2000). These emphasise physical 
location as a container for interacting firms, upstream / downstream linkages and supporting 
industries; cluster approaches also seek to replace traditional sectoral interventions with an 
area-wide strategy. In its ‘Triple Helix’ flavour, cluster policy focuses on interactions 
between the private sector, local government and universities’ ‘third mission’ activities 
(Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1998).  
 
Cluster approaches have been widely criticised on conceptual grounds – as too loosely 
defined to be useful, ignoring negative effects of agglomeration and entry, and glossing over 
detailed channels (Martin and Sunley, 2003, Duranton, 2011). Empirical analysis also tends 
to find little impact of cluster policies on area-level outcomes (van der Linde, 2003). The 
empirical literature is less clear on what more effective policies might involve, although a 
recent major study highlights the need to encourage entrepreneurial activity, and develop 
individual firms’ managerial and absorptive capacities (Bresnahan and Gambardella, 2004b). 
Similarly, Nathan and Overman (Forthcoming) argue for more spatially-sensitive horizontal 
programmes, combined with policies to promote urban-level agglomeration. Questions also 
remain about the appropriate roles of FDI, export promotion, public procurement policies, 
and U-I linkages (Javorcik, 2004, Uyarra and Flanagan, 2009, Lawton Smith and Bagchi-Sen, 
2011, Aghion et al., 2012). 
 
One key criticism of cluster models is that they ignore negative feedback channels.  Over 
time, urban affordances are double-edged. Agglomeration economies help firms in cities 
become more productive; as the cluster grows, though, the costs of co-location also rise as 
firms compete for limited resources (Combes et al., 2005). Similarly, clusters generate and 
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attract new entrants, who may enhance knowledge spillovers, increase levels of competition 
or both (Markusen and Venables, 1999). If competition and creative destruction force 
incumbents to innovate and push the weakest firms out of the market, this raises aggregate 
productivity but there are individual winners and losers (Melitz, 2003, Aghion et al., 2009). 
Policymakers will thus need to balance raising overall (national) welfare, with the desire to 
build (area-level) cluster competitiveness (Aghion et al., 2012, Acemoglu et al., 2013). 
 
How might a policy shock such as the Tech City initiative affect an area? The shock might 
play out through a combination of channels: 1) area reputation effects; firm entry leading to 
2) knowledge spillovers and/or 3) increased competition; and 4) property market effects, in 
particular accelerating property costs for local firms. These effects may be moderated by 
subsequent policy responses, which in turn influence location decisions by future generations 
of firms.  
 
 
3.  Methodology  
 
Our empirical strategy has two strands. First, we conducted microdata analysis from 1997-
2010, primarily using the Business Structure Database (BSD), a firm-level dataset that 
provides close to a universe of UK businesses (Office of National Statistics, 2012). This 
gives us a detailed fix on the cluster’s size and long-term evolution, as well as patterns of co-
location within area and industry. We focus on firms with BIS-DCMS digital economy SIC 
codes, and create ward-level firm and employment counts.. Note that the BSD excludes firms 
below the UK VAT threshold or those without employees on the PAYE system. As such, it 
likely undercounts digital economy firms. While employment estimates will be minimally 
affected, firm tallies will be lower bounds.2 
 
Second, we used semi-structured interviews with local firms and stakeholders. This allows us 
to get a ‘street-level’ sense of the cluster, firms’ location decisions and ways of working, and 
to get an early sense of Tech City impacts.  The firm sample is drawn from the Tech City 
Map, the largest business directory for the area.3 We drew a random sample of 100 firms, 
                                                 
2 Manual checking by the Secure Data Service using firm names and postcodes from the Tech City Map to the 
BSD confirms that this is the case for technology companies in East London.  
3 www.techcitymap.com, accessed 24 June 2013.  
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stratifying on these groups. 4  Within the sample we identified five firms from Wired 
Magazine’s list of ‘Silicon Roundabout’ firms (Wired UK, 2010). These are likely to be 
older, more established and successful businesses. Phone and email contact yielded 36 face to 
face interviews in 34 companies, all with founders / senior managers. We also assembled a 
control group of non-local technology firms using the DueDil/Tech Hub London-wide list of 
‘real tech start-ups’ (DueDil and TechHub, 2011), and conducted three semi-structured 
interviews by phone.  Finally, using snowballing for recruitment, a series of face-to-face 
stakeholder interviews were conducted across the public and private sectors.5  
 
 
4.  Findings: quantitative 
 
4.1  Mapping 
 
Despite its fluid boundaries, Inner East London has three foundational geographies. The first 
attempt at mapping the system was Matt Biddulph’s speculative, jokey ‘Silicon Roundabout’, 
covering 15 firms around the Old Street intersection (Bradshaw, 2008). In early 2010 Wired 
magazine expanded this to 42 companies (Wired UK, 2010). Most recently, and following 
the area’s official branding as ‘Tech City’, the Tech City Map provides a live mapping of 
over 1,000 digital economy firms. None of these surveys is designed to be comprehensive, 
however, and existing estimates of cluster size vary wildly (Nathan et al., 2012). 
 
Our analysis re-maps the cluster using richer, time-consistent data. Rough mapping using 
BSD employment density aggregates indicates a series of digital economy hotspots across 
inner London (Figure 1). Inner East London is at the eastern end of this corridor, spanning 
the boroughs of Islington, Hackney, the City and Tower Hamlets. Within the area we identify 
three ‘core wards’ – Clerkenwell, Hoxton and Haggerston – and nine ‘wider wards’ – the 
three core wards, plus Bunhill, Cripplegate, Portsoken, Spitalfields, St Peter’s and 
Whitechapel.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Random sampling without replacement, n = 1050 firms.  
5 Interviews were anonymised and transcribed. Manual text coding was done using Dedoose.  
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The mapping shows both the spatial continuity with other well-known creative economy 
hotspots in London, and temporal continuity with previous ‘versions’ of the area, notably its 
past official incarnation as the ‘City Fringe’ (Hutton, 2008). Echoing Foord (2013) we also 
find suggestive evidence of ‘micro-clustering’:  ICT and digital content have subtly different 
employment geographies. This suggests both close interactions between firms, and the 
localised knowledge spillovers typical of a Marshallian industrial milieu (Marshall, 1918) or 
Porterian cluster (Porter, 2000). Our qualitative analysis confirms this (see section five).  
 
4.2  Counting 
 
Next, we use BSD data to track firms and employment from 1997-2010 (the latest available 
data at the time). For 2010, we find 1,390 enterprises in core wards and 2,790 in the wider 
area. Note that these are substantially higher than official counts, even with under-counting 
built into the data structure.   
 
Overall, firm counts have almost doubled from 1997-2010 (Figure 2). We can see four phases 
in the area’s development: slow growth in the late 1990s, peaking in the first dot-com boom; 
gradually accelerating growth in the mid-late 2000s; and a tailing-off in the last few years 
(some of this may stem from the newest firms not appearing in the VAT rolls). Digital 
content firms drive growth to a striking extent: these businesses have closest functional and 
product linkages to the wider creative economy, and this is suggestive of a ‘branching’ from 
the creative economy towards the digital. Note also how much action occurs before the area’s 
unofficial ‘naming’ as Silicon Roundabout in 2008, and its official ‘branding’ as Tech City in 
late 2010. Company registrations have risen substantially since 2010, but only a fraction of 
these businesses will scale enough to make it into the BSD.6   
 
Turning to employment by sector, the digital economy supported over 46,700 jobs in 2010, 
with the biggest share in digital content (Table 1). ‘Digital economy employment’ also rose 
                                                 
6 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/affb7498-ed52-11e2-ad6e-00144feabdc0.html (accessed 30 September 2013).  
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rather faster in Inner East London than in the city as a whole, more than doubling between 
1997 and 2010 (versus a 44 percentage point jump in Greater London).7  
 
 
Notably, while Greater London’s digital economy employment fell by 16,000 in 2009-2010, 
it rose inside the cluster. This was driven by employment in digital content sectors, with 
falling employment in ICT businesses.   
 
As a share of the Inner East London employment base, the digital economy has become 
increasingly dominant, rising from around 5% to over 15% of all jobs in the period (Figure 
3). The area is notably denser in digital jobs than Greater London (which it overtook) around 
2000 and the rest of the UK.  However, employment shares start to flatten off in the mid-
2000s.  Given that job counts for Inner East London have risen overall during that period, 
this suggests some diversification in the wider local economy.     
 
 
In employment terms, digital content is the dominant component of the digital economy both 
in East London and across the UK (Figure 4). However, note that Greater London has a 
substantially higher digital content employment share than Silicon Roundabout; this is driven 
by the higher quantum of firms outside the area, and the relative absence of large content 
employers (such as advertising, publishing, print or broadcast media).  
 
 
We also conducted further within-sector analysis on the area’s industrial composition. These 
results are limited by SIC coding; the ICT sub-sector is dominated by telecoms and computer 
hardware consultancy, while digital content is more diverse, with software consultancy, 
advertising, radio and TV, news and publishing taking the largest shares. 8  Again, this 
highlights branching towards ‘creative digital’ activities. Exploratory analysis by the Tech 
                                                 
7 ‘Digital economy employment’, ‘ICT employment’ and ‘digital content employment’ refers to all jobs in these 
sectors, rather than the subset of jobs in those sectors with relevant occupational content. For a related analysis 
on both sectoral and occupational dimensions, see Bakshi et al (2012).  
8 Full results are available on request. 
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City Map indicates the huge diversity of content activities within these broad categories: a 
rceent survey of 774 Tech City Map firms found that 16% work in digital marketing, and 
more than half are ‘creative tech’ firms such as 3D and animation designers (Star, 2011).   
 
 
5.  Findings: qualitative  
 
We begin with some pen-portraits of firms and their founders; then discuss ways of working, 
affordances of the area, perceived challenges and views of policy. Findings from the core 
group and the control group are very similar, except where stated.  
 
5.1  Founders and firms  
 
Our interviewees were predominantly male, white and UK-born. The group is notably less 
gender and ethnic-diverse than the local community or the average London start-up.9  Over 
40% of the group were in their 30s, with 2/3 over 30. This is some way from the popular 
image of scruffy tech geniuses, but reflects other research on the demographics of successful 
tech entrepreneurs (Wadhwa et al., 2008). In particular, those from the ‘Wired list’ – broadly, 
the most established businesses – were exclusively in the late 30s age bracket. Some of these 
latter were classic serial entrepreneurs, active since the dot-com boom. The sample is also 
highly educated: almost all had a degree, around a third have postgraduate qualifications (not 
all in computer science) and around a third had been to Oxbridge. 
 
By contrast, the profile of firms is very different: 21 out of 34 are less than five years old, a 
lot younger than the Greater London SME average (7.9 years) and the UK digital economy 
average (7.6 years).10  Half the sample are start-ups – companies less than three years old, 
including spin-outs from large firms (Blank, 2011). This is slightly less than the 60% 
identified earlier by Vandore (2011). 
 
All the firms are SMEs. Over half are micro-businesses (10 employees or less); a third were 
small businesses (11-50 employees) and five were medium-size. Six of the firms were 
                                                 
9 Sample descriptives compared with Greater London means from the 2010 Small Business Survey.  
10 Sample descriptives compared with 2010 SBS data. Unless otherwise stated, ‘firms’ refers to enterprises. In a 
few cases, sites visited are local units of a larger business.  
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branches of larger businesses, often deliberately placed in East London; one had recently 
been acquired by a large multinational.  
 
Activities ranged from software development to viral media to digital PR. Echoing the 
quantitative analysis, the vast bulk were in digital content industries, although a few might be 
placed in ICT sectors such as ‘computer hardware consultancy’. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
less than half the sample (15/34) considered themselves ‘tech’ companies, and many found 
the question hard to answer: 
 
 To be honest it’s virtually impossible to explain what we do. …we are a tech company 
 definitely but we are also equally a creative company. (E12, C11) 
 
 Most people [here] are from an engineering or a computer science background. But 
 … we probably see ourselves as a games company now. (E23, C21) 
 
5.2  Ways of working  
 
Firms exhibited global and local working patterns, particularly for production-side networks. 
Core workforces were typically located locally, along with key networking, selling and 
business development functions. But we also uncovered extensive international operations: 
around 40% of firms (14/34) had bases in more than one country, the majority in two to four 
locations, with a couple of present in six or more. The majority are Varian’s ‘micro-
multinationals’:  
 
It’s one or two people in all of those countries … getting business and using 
freelancers to deliver. And coming back to us for advice on intellectual property and 
things like that.. (E2, C1) 
 
You can find very highly skilled IT people based in Russia and the Ukraine, for about 
a third of the price of the UK or even less, and they work harder, you haven’t got to 
manage them so much because they can work from home over there. (E11, C10) 
 
We found a combination of the accidental and the strategic. One team had opened a ‘New 
York office’ because they’d found a strong programmer living there. We also found low-cost 
attempts to internationalise – for example, buying a US landline number that re-routed calls 
to the founders’ UK mobiles.  
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Customer networks had multiple geographies, with firms selling to the rest of London, UK-
wide or internationally. Local customers were notably sparse – but many firms appreciated 
the area’s proximity to large markets in Central London (see below).  
 
5.3  The area  
 
We found substantial differences between location decisions of older firms (and founders) 
and younger businesses. For the former, the decision was often by chance: founders lived 
nearby, or had been offered free/cheap space:  
 
So I’ve always lived in Hackney when I’ve lived in London, … and ]a friend] found … 
some bit of Hackney council who will put you in touch with landlords … So we 
actually, through that … literally a room above a pub … So we … spent £50 on the 
cheapest possible IKEA furniture, and moved in there. … And we … just more or less 
stumbled on the fact that this was a really good part of town to be in. … word of 
mouth, other friends ended up renting other rooms in that type of pub, and you started 
to have that tiny network effect. (E18, C16) 
 
Those in the control group showed similar decision-making sequences. By contrast, younger 
businesses (especially start-ups) had made deliberate choices, often informed by awareness of 
‘Tech City’:   
 
First of all, this [co-working] place was half as expensive as any serviced office. And 
secondly, there was an article in the Economist… and we saw that … and said, ‘well, 
there’s a lot going on.’ (E6, C5) 
 
For those in East London, the area supports firms’ global-local production techniques, and 
provides strong market access to customers, both locally and further afield. Cited advantages 
include cheap space (versus more central parts of London); excellent amenities (especially 
food, coffee and nightlife); easy access to the rest of London; presence of similar firms, and 
general ‘buzz’. Notably, ‘buzz’ delineated both a kind of social wallpaper that helps attract 
and maintain staff; a source of ideas; and a source of collaborators, with formal and informal 
networks, serendipitous meetings and the area’s ‘soft infrastructure’ playing important roles.  
 
You have no problem, ever, persuading someone to work here. Whereas, if we were 
on a Science Park in Newbury, I’m certain we wouldn’t find good calibre developers 
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when we needed them, or that if we could they wouldn’t want to move to where we 
were. So that’s the first thing. Apart from that, it’s kind of handy being close to other 
like-minded companies…. I actually don’t think you get many pearls of wisdom in 
those conversations, but it just makes you feel less isolated. (E32, C30) 
 
If someone’s sort of interested in streetscape and visual culture then this is a good 
place to be. There’s lots of new ideas, inspiration … we work a lot with creative 
agencies … It helps that we have a sense of what’s fresh and what’s new. (E28, C26) 
 
I like the fact that you bump into interesting people or that you might sort of read 
something that someone’s written online and then meet them down at the pub. … 
when I worked in South Kensington that never happened.(E8, C7) 
 
The lack of a traditional, physical supply chain means that these firms are much more 
sensitive to softer factors affecting production. Such affordances also help shape firms’ 
location choices within the area. Echoing our mapping, we found evidence of careful sorting 
on sometimes very tight geographies: for example, one social media firm had moved, as it 
grew, four times since its inception – staying within the same 200-metre radius of Brick 
Lane.   
 
I don’t want to move anywhere else. I wouldn’t ever dream of going to Soho. I would 
probably go kicking and screaming to Clerkenwell. (E16, C14) 
 
For most, these upsides vastly outweigh the negatives: in many interviews firms had to be 
actively prompted on the latter. The most common complaint is rising rent, the inevitable 
consequence of the attention the area is receiving (see 5.5). Other complaints cited by a few 
included the ugly streetscape, lack of amenities for mothers, and the lack of obvious ‘Tech 
City’ signifiers. Notably, given the area’s impoverished ‘East End’ reputation, crime was 
only mentioned by a couple of firms.  
 
5.4 Future challenges  
 
Both in our main group and the control group, firms highlighted various growth barriers, in 
particular access to finance, finding and retaining skilled workers, and management capacity 
(Table 2). 
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Many of these are generic SME challenges, but with digital economy ‘twists’ that make them 
substantially harder to overcome. Some of these are rooted in the global structure of the 
digital sector; others in the inherent novelty of digital economy activity; others features of the 
young East London system.  
 
The inability to find skilled staff was often the most important issue. Firms argued that there 
was an undersupply of skilled developers in the UK – often blaming school and university 
syllabuses –  forcing them to rely more on immigrant workers. This often meant hiring from 
outside the EEA (and notably from North America, South or South-East Asia).  
 
No [UK] education coupled with visa restrictions is not a particularly good 
combination. (E6, C5) 
 
In turn, current UK migration rules caused problems, especially the (real and perceived) time, 
costs and bureaucracy involved in processing applications. Firms were typically too small, or 
lacked capacity, to take advantage of more relaxed rules on inter-company transfers. (The oft-
cited ‘Entrepreneur Visa’ may raise the supply of new business founders, but has no effect on 
existing firms seeking skilled staff.)    
 
While barriers to entry in technology sectors are often very low, risk levels are high. Potential 
investors need to be both risk-loving and very well-informed about these sectors, something 
not generally true of the current UK early investor community. We found three groups of 
firms: a small group who’d been able to rely on personal contacts; a bootstrapping group 
(who as a result, often felt unwilling to look for external later stage finance); and a third 
group who’d had to look for angel or VC money, with mixed results. Many complained about 
UK investors’ risk-aversion, small size and focus on established prospects:   
 
In Silicon Valley you can get investment based on an idea. And that’s because they’re 
used to investing in tech. (E2, C1) 
 
 Investors need to understand what tech investment is all about … [It’s] VC 
investment with high risk, very improbable returns. Understanding that needs to be 
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put forward. I’ve been in VC for four years now and it’s quite hard to educate 
someone around this. (S1) 
 
We need a second round of funding to actually develop [our product]. If we were in 
the US we would probably have gotten it all at once. But we’re not in the US. So 
we’ve had to split it up into a number of small steps. (E24, C22) 
 
This last point echoes other research on co-ordination problems in UK VC (Reed, 2010, 
Lerner et al., 2011, Marston et al., 2013). Of the ten UK Enterprise Capital Funds, only one 
specialises in digital economy investments. And only a handful of banks, VCs and angel 
investors specialising in the digital economy are physically located in the area.11  
 
The East London cluster is still embryonic compared to the South Bay Area: inexperienced 
investors are reacting to business plans from (often) new and inexperienced companies. So 
the supply of high quality entrepreneurs also has to improve (Rigos, 2011). Similarly, one 
interviewee remarked on the lack of ‘elder wisdom’ in East London compared to the US 
West Coast, ‘where I’ve had my most useful conversations’:  
 
It’s either being able to call someone when you’ve got a problem … a web server 
scalability problem, or whether you’re about to raise a round of funding and you’re 
wondering what to do about, you know, salary rises for your early employee or 
issuing equity …  (E18, C16) 
 
Older entrepreneurs and venture capital providers in London we spoke to are often happy to 
help with advice – but young entrepreneurs lack networking skills  or gravitate to the ‘beer 
and pizza’ events where they network with each other, rather than older, more experienced 
entrepreneurs. Networks, although mushrooming, are still nascent (S1, S4).  
 
5.5 The Tech City initiative   
 
Contrasting messages about Tech City emerged from our East London interviews. Awareness 
was lower than expected: around a third of interviewees had little or no knowledge about the 
initiative (likely to be vanishingly small now). Those with views split down the middle, with 
                                                 
11 This has been changing since the primary research period, with Silicon Valley Bank and other investors 
opening offices in the area. 
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equal counts of positive and negative opinions. Optimists welcomed the attention Tech City 
could bring:  
 
Tech City’s great. I think all of this helps to push the ecosystem generally, because it 
gets into people’s minds … (E24, C22) 
 
It’s creating a lot of similar-minded people in the area as well, and all of those people 
can feed off each other and the different ideas, the sense of community, can really 
make each of their businesses better. (E11, C10) 
 
Pessimists – often older firms or more experienced founders – were more sceptical:  
 
Tech City is what government people call it. I don’t think I’ve heard anyone call it 
Tech City without sort of air quotes. (E18, C16) 
 
My personal perception of Tech City is very much a government jumping on the 
bandwagon, and sticking a label on it. (E23, C21) 
 
There was some confusion about governance – some knew about TCIO, but the organisation 
had a low profile. Ministers’ public interest had also led some to think the initiative was 
‘Cameron’s baby’ or similar.  Notably, there was little interest in relocating to the Olympic 
Park, which was seen as disconnected from, and lacking the critical mass of Shoreditch:  
 
 It feels like the kind of thing where there’d be a first user disadvantage to that space. 
There’d be a worry that you would be moving out onto a tumbleweed strewn cul de 
sac, and would be cut off from the vibrancy … associated with this particular area.. 
(E33, C31) 
 
For us it is not an option to be based in Stratford. Because we have to be in close 
proximity to our clients. (E5, C4) 
 
Some concerns arguably reflect perception over reality – local connections to Stratford are 
excellent, even if the Olympic Park is harder to reach. Nevertheless, the iCity initiative will 
clearly need to persuade smaller firms to locate in the campus, especially as there are already 
multiple technology property markets (for example in Dalston, London Bridge, Canary 
Wharf and west of Soho) (Savills, 2012).  
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At the time of the research, only suggestive evidence of policy impacts was available. No one 
doubted that ‘Tech City’ had raised the area’s profile: its bright light had already affected 
industry location decisions, especially for younger firms. It was impossible to tell whether 
new entry has been felt most keenly through the spillovers or competition channels, although 
some expressed worries about poaching of ideas and staff. What was already evident were 
significant property market effects. Around 40% of interviewees were worried about the cost 
of office space, with many contemplating relocation:  
 
One of the disadvantages of being in an area that’s getting trendier and trendier and 
trendier is that the rents are going through the roof. It’s on the edge of being 
sustainable. (E29, C27) 
 
As a senior GLA politician put it at a project seminar:  
 
Even if a third of firms in Tech City haven’t heard of it, you can bet every estate agent 
has. (S9)  
 
 
6.  New directions? 
 
Inner East London’s digital economy is a striking example of a cluster, with a number of 
distinctive features. It has evolved organically, emerging out of technological shifts in the 
creative industries, and maintaining important structural links to the wider London creative 
economy. At area level, this manifests itself in evidence of progressive ‘branching’ from 
creative to ‘creative digital’ firms and employment. In terms of geography and business 
population, Silicon Roundabout is also tiny compared to Silicon Valley, and is centred on a 
few highly specific neighbourhoods, with some micro-clustering within the zone; conversely, 
property market pressures now seem to be shifting boundaries outwards. The system is also 
striking for the historical lack of HE actors or ‘Triple Helix’ activity: so far universities have 
acted as providers of skilled people, nothing more.  
 
The launch of the Tech City initiative has hugely raised the area’s profile, and may have 
created an inflection point in its development. However, many policy challenges remain.  
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Early Tech City strategy had three broad goals: to develop the area, to raise levels of FDI, 
and to generate a halo effect for the Olympic Park. This research has highlighted the tensions 
between these objectives. The impacts of FDI on incumbents are not straightforward, and 
may generate benefits (via knowledge spillovers) or costs (via competition in the 
marketplace, for inputs or both): the quality and absorptive capacity of incumbents matters 
(Meyer and Sinani, 2009). Given the still-developing state of the cluster, it is not clear that 
simply maximising the level of foreign investment is helpful if the aim is also to develop 
London and the UK’s competitive position. Rather, policymakers should identify 
complementary investments (such as finance providers, auxiliary services and workspace 
managers) and seek to attract the right mix, as well as helping the strongest locally-based 
firms with support in international expansion and exports. Encouragingly, there are signs that 
the TCIO is moving to such a model (Tech City Investment Organisation, 2012), as is the 
GLA.12 Equally, policymakers need to be realistic about the agglomeration diseconomies and 
processes creative destruction inherent in a growing cluster: failure rates are high and 
preserving incumbent positions may come at the expense of achieving wider welfare goals. 
There are fewer signs that this deeper tension is being addressed.   
 
Equally, policymakers should downplay the Olympic Park as a natural extension of the 
Shoreditch cluster; as our interviewees make clear, this is not credible. The Broadcast / 
Media Centre site is a natural campus space for large organisations: not surprisingly, the first 
tenants include a university (Loughborough) and a multinational (BT).13 In theory the site 
could also develop a Shoreditch-style industrial district. A community of like-minded small 
firms in iCity would make locating there more attractive, and this offers one possible route 
for policymakers to take, as well as exploring links to the creative community in nearby 
Hackney Wick. More seriously, there is no obvious locational logic to the iCity site: as our 
mapping makes clear, there are already a number of digital economy hotspots in London (and 
related property markets). Analogies to Canary Wharf are misleading – technology firms 
have far more spatial choice than financial services firms did in the 1990s.  
 
At the time of writing, several new features are emerging. First, there are signs of further 
industry branching, notably financial services technology (‘fintech’), environmental software 
                                                 
12 http://www.london.gov.uk/priorities/business-economy/for-business/recruitment/foreign-workers (accessed 
30 September 2013).  
13 http://icitylondon.com (accessed 24 June 2013).  
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/ services (‘cleanweb’) and digital manufacturing. These new production spaces exploit 
existing knowledge bases, notably software and web dev, and large downstream markets – 
information-hungry financial services firms, and London’s ageing, inefficient physical 
infrastructures.  
 
Second, and linked to this, cluster boundaries are undergoing further spatial shifts.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests technology firms are selecting into contiguous neighbourhoods in the 
North (such as Dalston and central Hackney 14 ), South (the City of London) and West 
(Camden and King’s Cross), as well as the large Level39 accelerator space in Canary Wharf 
(ironically, founded by the former head of TCIO).15   How far these shifts are driven by 
property costs is unclear. Average local rent rises are in line with the rest of London.16 For 
younger firms, the shared workspace market is thriving, with new providers entering the 
market (notably Google Campus) and existing providers expanding (Tech Hub, the 
Trampery, Hoxton Mix, Central Working). However, the core streets around Shoreditch lack 
large floorplate offices, with little opportunity for new construction given the urban grain. 
Competing uses  – whether other sectors, residential or student halls – may also ramp up 
costs for SMEs.  
 
Governance arrangements are also evolving. Many challenges facing East London firms are 
not amenable to area-based cluster initiatives: in particular, finance markets, skills and 
migration policies involve largely or wholly national policy levers. This multi-level issue set 
calls for careful governance, bringing together local private actors (entrepreneurs, firms, 
investors, landlords, local amenities), public actors (the London Mayor and GLA, Boroughs, 
universities and colleges) and national actors (the Department of Business (BIS) and 10 
Downing Street). So far, the unstable politics of Tech City has been unhelpful in this respect. 
Early Tech City thinking was dominated by  Downing Street, driven by two key officials, 
Steve Hilton and Rohan Silva, who have now left Government. There are some signs that 
Tech City may dissolve into a bigger, national strategy: both BIS and TCIO have signalled 
interest in developing a ‘cluster of clusters’ across the UK. Thus the London Mayor – who 
has so far shown sporadic interest in the area – will need to play a more active role. 
                                                 
14 The Trampery recently opened a major new space in London Fields, for example 
(http://www.thetrampery.com/#london_fields__hackney_ (accessed 30 September 2013).  
15 Level 39 is ‘Europe’s largest accelerator space for finance, retail and future cities technology companies.’ 
(http://www.level39.co, accessed 24 June 2013.)  
16 http://techcitynews.com/2013/05/20/office-rents-not-inflated-by-tech-city-hype/ (accessed 30 September 
2013).  
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Several research gaps remain. Future analysis could use Companies House data to track 
business formation and survival in more detail; larger scale surveys would provide structured, 
fine-grained information on company behaviour, and shifts into new geographic and product 
spaces should also be explored.  There is a also a clear need for research on the social impacts 
of ‘Tech City’, not least on local residents and neighbourhoods where the initiative is likely 
to be accelerating gentrification.  
 
  
24 
 
List of tables and figures  
 
Table 1. Employment growth in the digital economy, 1997-2010. 
Year 
core wards IEL 
DE ICT DC DE ICT DC 
1997 826 126 700 1591 348 1243 
1998 885 184 701 1803 508 1295 
1999 959 220 739 1982 674 1308 
2000 1027 257 770 2102 734 1368 
2001 1072 276 796 2216 793 1423 
2002 1053 264 789 2228 765 1463 
2003 1181 268 913 2643 712 1931 
2004 1201 254 947 2611 681 1930 
2005 1189 243 946 2614 630 1984 
2006 1213 239 974 2828 635 2193 
2007 1259 236 1023 2779 597 2182 
2008 1357 254 1103 2830 605 2225 
2009 1437 256 1181 2896 596 2300 
2010 1406 228 1178 2870 570 2300 
 
Source: BSD / SDS.  
Note: IEL = Inner East London, GL = Greater London.  
 
 
Table 2. Key challenges for inner East London firms.  
Issue set Number of firms citing as challenge 
Business development  19 
Access to finance  17 
Skills gaps 14 
Mentoring and management advice 13 
Workspace access and cost 13 
Connectivity 13 
Source: authors' analysis. 
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Figure 1. Inner London’s digital economy: job density 2008-10.  
Source: BRES / NOMIS. Map by Duncan Smith. 
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Figure 2. Digital economy firm counts in Inner East London, 1997-2010.  
 
 
 
Source: BSD / ONS. 
 
 
  
27 
 
Figure 3. Digital economy employment shares, 1997-2010.   
 
 
Source: BSD / ONS. 
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Figure 4. Digital content shares, 1997-2010.   
 
 
 
Source: BSD / ONS. 
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APPENDIX 1  
 
Table A1: Digital economy SIC codes: ICT. 
 
Code Description 
3001 Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
3002 Manufacture of computers and other information processing equipment 
3110 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 
3120 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 
3130 Insulated wire and cable 
3140 Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 
3150 Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps 
3161 Manufacture of electrical equipment for engines and vehicles not elsewhere classified 
3162 Manufacture of other electrical equipment not elsewhere classified 
3210 Electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 
3220 Television, radio transmitters and apparatus for telephony and telegraphy 
3230 Television/radio receivers, sound or video recording or producing apparatus / rel goods 
3310 Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances 
3320 Instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating, other purposes 
3330 Manufacture of industrial process control equipment 
3340 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 
3350 Manufacture of watches and clocks 
5141 Wholesale of textiles 
5142 Wholesale of clothing and footwear 
5143 Wholesale of electrical household appliances and radio and television goods 
5144 Wholesale of china and glassware, wallpaper and cleaning materials 
5145 Wholesale of perfume and cosmetics 
5146 Wholesale of pharmaceutical goods 
5147 Wholesale of other household goods 
5181 Wholesale of machine tools 
5182 Wholesale of mining, construction and civil engineering machinery 
5183 Wholesale of machinery for the textile industry, and of sewing and knitting machines 
5184 Wholesale of computers, computer peripheral equipment and software 
5185 Wholesale of other office machinery and equipment 
5186 Wholesale of other electronic parts and equipment 
5187 Wholesale of other machinery for use in industry, trade and navigation 
6411 Post and courier activities 
6420 Telecommunications 
7131 Renting of agricultural machinery and equipment 
7132 Renting of construction and civil engineering machinery and equipment 
7133 Renting of office machinery and equipment including computers 
7134 Renting of other machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified 
  
Table continues overleaf …  
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Code Description 
7210 Computer Hardware consultancy 
7221 Publishing of software 
7222 Other software consultancy and supply 
7230 Data processing 
7240 Database activities 
7250 Maintenance and repair of office, accounting and computing machinery 
7260 Other computer related activities 
 
 
Source: BIS/ DCMS 2009.  
Notes: Codes in bold are included. Where included code is specified at SIC3 (SIC4) detail, I include all neighbours in 
the SIC2 (SIC3) cell. Codes in yellow are included in digital content (see table A2). 
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Table A2: Digital economy SIC codes: digital content 
 
SIC2003 Description 
2211 Publishing of books 
2212 Publishing of newspapers 
2213 Publishing of journals and periodicals 
2214 Publishing of sound recordings 
2215 Other publishing 
2221 Printing of newspapers 
2222 Printing not elsewhere classified 
2223 Bookbinding 
2224 Pre-press activities 
2225 Ancillary activities relating to printing 
2231 Reproduction of sound recording 
2232 Reproduction of video recording 
2233 Reproduction of computer media 
7210 Computer Hardware consultancy 
7221 Publishing of software 
7222 Other software consultancy and supply 
7230 Data processing 
7240 Database activities 
7250 Maintenance and repair of office, accounting and computing machinery 
7260 Other computer related activities 
7410 Legal and auditing; tax consultancy; market research; business and management consulting 
7420 Architectural and engineering activities and related technical consultancy 
7430 Technical testing and analysis 
7440 Advertising 
7450 Labour recruitment and provision of personnel 
7460 Investigation and security activities 
7470 Industrial cleaning 
7481 Photographic activities 
7482 Packaging activities 
7485 Secretarial and translation activities 
7486 Call centre activities 
7487 Other business activities not elsewhere classified 
9211 Motion picture and video production 
9212 Motion picture and video distribution 
9213 Motion picture projection 
9220 Radio & TV 
9230 Other entertainment activities 
9240 News agency activities 
9250 Library, archives, museums and other cultural activities 
9260 Sporting activities 
9270 Other recreational activities  
 
Source: BIS/ DCMS 2009.  
Notes: 3-digit / 4-digit SIC. Codes in bold are included. Where included code is specified at SIC3 (SIC4) detail, I 
include all neighbours in the SIC2 (SIC3) cell. Codes in yellow are included in ICT (see table A1).  
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